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TORTS-Civil Liability of Athletes-Professional Football Player
May Have Tort Claim For Injuries Intentionally Inflicted Dur-
ing Football Game. Hackbart v. Cincinnati Bengals, Inc., 601
F.2d 516 (10th Cir. 1979).
In Hackbart v. Cincinnati Bengals, Inc.' the United States Court
of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit held that a professional football
player, injured by an opponent during a regular season game, may
have a cause of action to recover damages from the opposing player
and team. This decision reversed the ruling of the trial court that, as
a matter of "social policy," traditional principles governing liability
for the infliction of personal injuries are inapplicable when the in-
jury occurs on a professional football field.2 Although the court of
appeals remanded the cause for a factual determination of damages
and causation,3 the court's recognition of potential civil liability for
sports injuries is a message to professional leagues, teams, and play-
ers that malicious violence, even in the name of "sport," will not be
tolerated. Rather, athletes are subject to civil sanctions if they inflict
injuries in disregard of the safety of their opponents.
Plaintiff, Dale Hackbart, a veteran professional football player,4
sustained neck injuries,5 allegedly6 resulting from a blow delivered
1. Hackbart v. Cincinnati Bengals, Inc., 601 F.2d 516 (10th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 100
S. Ct. 275 (1979).
2. 435 F. Supp. 352 (D. Colo. 1977).
3. By agreement between the parties, the trial was bifurcated and the district court con-
sidered only the question of liability. Id at 353.
4. Dale Hackbart was a defensive free safety--a defensive player primarily responsible
for the prevention of long pass completions-for the Denver Broncos Football Club. When
the incident occurred in September 1973 Hackbart was thirty-five years old. He had eight
years experience in interscholastic and intercollegiate football and thirteen years experience as
a professional football player. Id
5. Plaintiff suffered a severe fracture of the cervical spine. Plaintifrs Second Amended
Complaint at 2, 4, Hackbart v. Cincinnati Bengals, 435 F. Supp. 352 (D. Colo. 1977).
In the appellate brief, however, appellant's counsel selected more general language to
describe the injury, indicating that Clark "broke his [Hackbart's] neck." Brief for Appellant at
5, Hackbart v. Cincinnati Bengals, 601 F.2d 516 (10th Cir. 1979).
For medical information regarding the nature of the injury sustained by appellant, see
generally GRADWOHL'S LEGAL MEDICINE 281 (F. Camps ed. 1976); F. ME'rLER, THE MEDI-
CAL SOURCEBOOK 320-26 (1st ed. 1959).
6. Although the causation issue was separated from the liability determination, the
Brief for Appellee notes that considerable doubt exists concerning whether Hackbart was in-
jured by Clark. According to the brief, "several minutes earlier in the game, plaintiff threw
himself through the air at another player, twisted his neck, and fell to the ground ... [and]
.. .was removed from the game for several subsequent plays." Brief for Appellee at I n.1,
Hackbart v. Cincinnati Bengals, 601 F.2d 516 (10th Cir. 1979).
to the back of his head by Charles "Booby" Clark7 during a Na-
tional Football League 8 contest between the Denver Broncos and the
Cincinnati Bengals.9 Notwithstanding Clark's action, for which no
penalty was assessed,"° Hackbart remained in the game and partici-
pated in two subsequent Broncos' games." Later, when Hackbart
was released on "waivers"' 2 by the Broncos, he received a physical
examination 3 and became aware of the damage to his spine and
neck. Dissatisfied with his contractual entitlement to compensa-
tion, 4 Hackbart brought this suit against Clark and the Cincinnati
7. Charles Clark was competing in his first regular season football game as a profes-
sional on the day of the incident. Clark was a running back, working under a contractual
arrangement with the Cincinnati Bengals Football Club, Inc., 435 F. Supp. at 353.
8. The National Football League (NFL) is an organization consisting of owners of ap-
proved professional football teams who operate franchises in designated cities. The league has
a constitution and by-laws that control the teams. Both the Cincinnati Bengals and the Denver
Broncos football clubs are members of the NFL. Id at 354. See also Comment, The Super
Bowl andthe Sherman Act." Professional Team Sports and the Antitrust Laws, 81 HARv. L. REV.
418 (1967).
9. The injury was allegedly sustained in the second quarter of the game, played in Den-
ver, on September 16, 1973. Clark was a potential pass receiver during an offensive play by the
Bengals. The play required Clark to enter the zone being protected by Hackbart. Another
Bronco, Billy Thompson, intercepted the pass and ran in an opposite direction from Clark and
Hackbart. After attempting to block Clark, Hackbart turned away from him and, with one
knee on the ground, watched the completion of Thompson's run. "[A]cting out of anger and
frustration .... " Clark delivered a blow with his right forearm and/or fist to the back of
Hackbart's head. 601 F.2d at 518-19.
10. Because of the failure of the game officials to see the incident, a personal foul penalty
was not imposed. Id at 519. See OFFICIAL RULES FOR PROFESSIONAL FOOTBALL (A. McNally
& N. Schachter eds. 1976).
Rule 12, § 2 Personal Fouls provides in pertinent part:
Article I. All players are prohibited from: (a) striking with the fists; .. or
(c) striking on the head, neck or face with the heel, back or side of the hand, wrist,
forearm, elbow or clasped hands.
Id. § 2, art. l(a), (c).
11. Although Hackbart experienced pain and soreness when he attempted to play golf
the day after the incident, no medical treatment was sought. On successive Sundays in Sep-
tember 1973 Hackbart participated in Denver Broncos contests against the Chicago Bears and
the San Francisco Forty-Niners. 435 F. Supp. at 353-54.
12. Release on "waivers" means that the player's team is seeking to terminate his con-
tract. Under NFL procedures, the "waived" player's contract may be purchased by any other
team in the league by paying a standard fee (approximately $20,000) to the original team. The
purchasing club also agrees to assume the team's contractual obligations. If no team purchases
a player's contract within the allotted time period, he is effectively terminated.
13. See NFL Player Contract § 12. Termination, § 13 Injury Grievance. The sample
contract used in the preparation of this note was supplied by the New York Jet Football Club
Inc. Section 12 provides, "If this contract is terminated by the Club and either Player or Club
so requests, Player will promptly undergo a complete physical examination by the Club physi-
cian." Id § 12.
The Injury Grievance provisions in § 13 allow the player to obtain a second opinion re-
garding his injuries by a physician of his choice. If disparate results occur, the matter is sub-
mitted to binding arbitration. Id § 13.
14. See id. § 9, which provides,
Injury. If Player is injured in the performance of his services under this contract and
promptly reports such injury to the Club physician or trainer, then Player will receive
such medical and hospital care during the term of this contract as the Club physician
may deem necessary, and, in accordance with Club's practice, will continue to receive
his yearly salary for so long, during the season of injury only and for no subsequent
Bengals. 5
The novelty of Hackbart's cause of action' 6 evidences the
unique position occupied by professional athletes in American soci-
ety. Since the time of ancient Greece, 7 athletes have received the
accolades and veneration of the public. Although the reasons for
this admiration are speculative,' 8 Americans have a similar attach-
ment to professional athletes. Every fall weekend over one hundred
million' 9 Americans view NFL contests on television. Adding to
period, as Player is physically unable to perform the services required of him by this
contract because of such injury.
In order to play for the Broncos in 1973, Hackbart, who failed the required pre-season
physical examination, signed "a waiver relieving the Broncos organization of financial liability
for further injury." Brief of Appellee, supra note 9, at 15.
The extent of the waiver is unclear from the materials supplied to the courts, but,
Hackbart did receive some compensation from the Denver Broncos for the 1973 season. 435 F.
Supp. at 354.
15. Appellant seeks to hold the Cincinnati Bengals liable on a theory that the Bengals'
coaching staff failed to instruct and control their "rookie" (first year professional) player. This
issue was not decided by either court because Clark was found not personally liable by the
district court. 435 F. Supp. at 357.
On the theory behind vicarious liability in sports, see generally Comment, Violence in
Professional Sports, 1975 Wisc. L. REV. 771.
The theory that responsibility should lie with team officials as well as players is sup-
ported by the essential nature of an athletic league's organization. When a player or
team is penalized for breaking the standards of recruiting or sportsmanship, the ulti-
mate sanction is suspension or removal of the parent club or institution (if amateur)
from participation in league activities. In summary, the role of those coaching in and
organizing athletic leagues should not be quickly dismissed as clearly beyond the
reach of legal sanctions.
Id at 777.
See also Averill v. Luttrell, 44 Tenn. App. 56, 311 S.W.2d 812 (1957) (defendant player
liable for assault and battery, but team not liable under respondeat superior).
16. Although other professional athletes have litigated personal injury claims, see, e.g.,
Averill v. Luttrell, 44 Tenn. App. 56, 311 S.W.2d 812 (1957), Hackbart is unique because the
athlete is a major league player and the cause of action is based on negligence and reckless
misconduct theories.
For a thorough discussion of the many examples of personal injury sports litigation, see J.
WEISTART & C. LOWELL, THE LAW OF SPORTS §§ 8.01-. 11 (1979).
17. See generally H. HARRIS, SPORT IN GREECE AND ROME (1972).
18. With respect to professional baseball, the court in Flood v. Kuhn, 309 F. Supp. 793
(S.D.N.Y. 1970), recognized the value of organized sports, noting,
Baseball has been the national pastime for over one hundred years and enjoys a
unique place in our American heritage. Major league professional baseball is avidly
followed by millions of fans, looked upon with fervor and pride and provides a spe-
cial source of inspiration and competitive team spirit especially for the young.
Id at 797.
Apart from the generally recognized personal benefits of sports participation, including
teamwork, physical fitness, self-confidence, potential college scholarship and other monetary
rewards, various sociological and psychological theories have been advanced to explain the
allure of sports. See, e.g., J. MICHENER, SPORTS IN AMERICA 18-63 (1976). Michener theorizes
that sports elicit a positive response from a great variety of people that he catagorizes as par-
ticipants (ranging from vigorous to social), quasi-participants (the sports promoters and bet-
tors) and the ardent spectator. Id
See also Koppett, Sports and the Law. An Overview, 18 N.Y.L.F. 815 (1973) (sporting
events are an escape from the routine of daily life); Slusher, Sport. A Philosophical Perspective,
38 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 129 (1973) (sports are a form of self-expression).
19. Statistics are from the 1976 NFL season. See Hechter, The Criminal Law and Vio-
lence in Sports, 19 CRIM. L.Q. 425, 437 n.60 (1977) (citing Booth, Clark Booth at the Super
Bowl, Death & Football, The Real Paper, Jan. 28, 1976, at 153, col. 2).
that figure the inestimable number of spectators at interscholastic
and intercollegiate football games, the public appeal of football be-
comes evident. Football, however, is but one of the myriad of sports
to which Americans have become attached.
Traditionally, this public attachment to athletics has resulted in
the placing of organized sports upon a pedestal largely beyond the
ambit of government regulation.2" Heretofore, professional football
has been regarded as a "self-regulated" industry,2' free from the
onus of certain legal doctrines.
22
In the last decade, however, professional football has evolved
from a game into a bona fide "industry. 23 Millions of dollars are
spent to acquire and retain gifted players and coaches, to construct
facilities, and to obtain broadcast rights to the games.24  Existing
professional sports leagues have been expanded to include new
franchises,25 and separate professional leagues26 have been orga-
20. Heretofore, the only major sport that has been regulated is boxing, both professional
and amateur, through state athletic commissions. No doubt exists that states may adopt such
statutes and impose regulations over sports. Antlers Athletic Ass'n v. Hartung, 85 Colo. 125,
274 P. 831 (1928). The rationale for boxing regulations, and, more recently, horse-racing, dog-
racing, auto-racing, jai-alai, and wrestling, is a public concern over the gambling that accom-
panies such sports contests. See, e.g., Tilelli v. Christenberry, 1 Misc. 2d 139, 120 N.Y.S.2d 697
(1953), in which the court stated,
The unsavory history of professional boxing in this State reveals why boxing matches
and all who participate in them are by legislative policy and enactment made subject
to the most inexorable and meticulous regulation. . . .The Legislature was plainly
apprehensive of the unwholesome influence exerted by gamblers, criminals and other
disreputable persons who dominated professional boxing. . . . [Tihe public was re-
volted by the sordid spectacle presented by professional boxing.
Id at 143, 120 N.Y.S.2d at 700.
But see Flood v. Kuhn, 309 F. Supp. 793, 797 (S.D.N.Y. 1970). The court lauds the game
of baseball and dreads the day regulations become necessary:
Baseball's status in the life of the nation is so pervasive that it would not strain credu-
lity to say the Court can take judicial notice that baseball is everybody's business. To
put it mildly and with restraint, it would be unfortunate indeed if a fine sport and
profession, which brings surcease from daily travail and an escape from the ordinary
to most inhabitants of this land, were to suffer in the least because of undue concen-
tration by any one or any group on commercial and profit considerations. The game
is on higher ground; it behooves every one to keep it there.
Id
21. 435 F. Supp. at 357. See generaly R. NOLL, GOVERNMENT AND THE SPORTS Busi-
NESS (1974). Noll describes a professional sports league as a "cartel, with the purpose of re-
stricting competition and dividing markets among firms in the industry." Id at 2.
22. The most obvious example of sports immunity is in the antitrust field. The United
States Supreme Court has held that federal antitrust laws do not apply to professional base-
ball. Federal Baseball Club v. National League, 259 U.S. 200 (1922).
In 1953 the Court denied another challenge to the exemption from antitrust laws for pro-
fessional baseball, finding it inappropriate for the Court to bring baseball within the law after
"[the business has thus been left for thirty years to develop, on the understanding that it was
not subject to existing antitrust legislation." Toolson v. New York Yankees, 346 U.S. 356, 357
(1953).
See generally Koppett, supra note 18, at 817-25; Morris, In The Wake of The Flood, 38
LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 85 (1973).
23. 435 F. Supp. at 354.
24. In 1975 the television rights paid for football games was $60,000,000. The cost of
obtaining television privileges for the NFL Championship - "Super Bowl" - was $2,500,000 in
1975. MICHENER, supra note 18, at 289.
25. Since 1970 new professional baseball franchises have been instituted in Montreal,
nized. In addition, sports such as tennis,27 soccer,28 and volleyball
29
have obtained professional status in the United States.
The substantial evolution in professional sports, coupled with
the litigious nature of contemporary Americans, has given rise to le-
gal challenges to doctrines and practices heretofore taken for
granted.30 For example, the special treatment for professional sports
franchises in antitrust 3' and labor law matters32 has been partially
eliminated. The appellate court decision in Hackbart is viewed as
another step by the judiciary toward the eradication of the "de facto
immunity" 33 enjoyed by athletes.
Contact sports,34 by definition, involve physical contact between
participants with the attendant risk of injury.35 Fortunately for the
athletes, most sports injuries are temporary and minor. Neverthe-
less, considerable public concern36 exists regarding the increase in
Toronto, San Diego, and Seattle. Professional football teams have been admitted to the NFL
in Tampa Bay, Florida and Seattle, Washington.
26. Examples of these new leagues include the World Football League (WFL) and the
World Hockey Association (WHA). Difficulties in attracting talented athletes and coaches
from established leagues and in obtaining television contracts have caused the WFL to fail and
the WHA to experience similar financial difficulty. See Philadelphia World Hockey Club, Inc.
v. Philadelphia Hockey Club, Inc., 351 F. Supp. 462 (E.D. Pa. 1972).
27. World Team Tennis (WTT).
28. North American Soccer League (NASL) and the American Soccer League (ASL).
29. International Volleyball Association (IVA).
30. One of the most heavily litigated controversies in sports law centers around the foot-
ball helmet. The cases are brought on a products liability theory to recover damages for severe
head, neck, and spine injuries caused by the negligent design of the helmets. For example,
Greg Stead was awarded $5.3 million by a Dade County, Florida jury for damages from paral-
ysis caused by a negligently designed helmet manufactured by Riddell, Inc. Although Stead
settled for a reported $3 million, his success has prompted identical suits against Riddell and
other manufacturers. In 1977 helmet manufacturers faced $150 million in negligence suits, in
an industry that only yields gross profits of $24 million. Since 1977, six of fourteen manufac-
turers have stopped making football helmets. See Philo & Stine, The Liability Path to Safer
Helmets, TRIAL, Jan. 1977, at 38; Underwood, An Unfolding Tragedy, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED,
Aug. 14, 1978, at 69-73.
31. Smith v. Pro-Football, 420 F. Supp. 738 (D.D.C. 1976) (draft is per se violation of
Sherman and Clayton Acts). Kapp v. National Football League, 390 F. Supp. 73 (N.D. Cal.
1974) (NFL rules constitute unreasonable restraints on trade in violation of Sherman Act).
32. Mackey v. National Football League, 407 F. Supp. 1000 (D. Minn. 1975) ("Rozelle
Rule" that requires acquiring club to compensate a player's former club is contrary to public
policy).
33. 12 GA. L. REV. 380, 382 (1978).
34. In this note, "contact sports" will include any sport that involves physical collisions
as a normal incident of the game. Emphasis is on the frequency, rather than the severity, of
the contact. Included in this definition are football, soccer, lacrosse, rugby, ice hockey, field
hockey, and to a lesser degree baseball and basketball.
35. The risk of injury in football is great. See Underwood, supra note 30, at 71-72, in
which the author indicates a million high school players, 70,000 college players, and 100% of
all NFL players are injured annually while playing football.
The United States Consumer Product Safety Commission reported in 1976 that 318,000
football injuries were treated in hospital emergency rooms, 30,000 of which were head and
neck injuries, including subdural hematomas, spinal cord injuries, fractured vertebrae,
pinched nerves, vascular injuries, and concussions. Philo & Stine, supra note 30, at 39; see
generally Hofeld, Athletes - Their Rights and Correlative Duties, 1975 TRIAL LAW. GUIDE 383.
Injuries are not unique to football. See also Hechter, supra note 19, at 431 (hockey), at
440 (baseball).
36. See Underwood, supra note 30, at 71.
number and severity of sports injuries.37 In organized sports, many
of the serious injuries are handled through contractual stipulations, 8
scholastic team arrangements, 39 and sometimes workmen's compen-
sation statutes.4" Thus, the doctrines governing the recognition and
application of civil liability for sports injuries, although hardly novel
legal concepts,4' have been developed in the context of unorganized
sports, separate from the special considerations emanating from the
professional status of the claimant.
Plaintiffs seeking recovery for sports injuries utilize three,
slightly varying tort theories.42 The first available cause of action
37. Violence and injuries in sports are not new phenomena. Old examples of sports
deaths include Owen McCourt, who was killed by a swinging hockey stick in a 1907 contest.
Hallowell & Meshbesher, Sports Violence and the Criminal Law, TRIAL, Jan. 1977 at 29.
Similarly, Ray Chapman was the victim of a "beanball" - baseball thrown at batter's head
- in a 1920 baseball game. Kanfer, Doing Violence to Sport, TIME, May 31, 1974, at 64.
At the turn of this century, college football became so violent that President Theodore
Roosevelt summoned school officials to the White House to demand major rule changes,
threatening to abolish the sport. In the 1905 season, eighteen deaths had occurred among
college football players. Underwood, supra note 30, at 71-72.
38. See note 17 supra. See also J. WEISTART & C. LOWELL, supra note 16, at § 3.06.
39. Liability for injuries sustained by amateur athletes in schools and colleges is beyond
the scope of this note. Most institutions require athletes to obtain medical insurance to pay for
injuries demanding professional treatment. See generally Drowatzky, On the Firing Line: Neg-
ligence in Physical Education, 6 J.L. & EDUC. 481 (1977); Franklin, Tort Liability of Schools,
U. ILL. L.F. 429 (1958); Miller, Personal Injury Litigation in School Cases, 20 LAW & CON-
TEMP. PROB. 60(1955); Annot., 35 A.L.R.3d 725 (1971) (liability of school for athletic injuries).
40. The NFL Player Contract recognizes that many jurisdictions include professional
athletes under the provisions of their workmen's compensation statutes, reducing the team's
liability by the amount of a workmen's compensation award. See generally A. LARSON, THE
LAW OF WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION § 14.00 (1972); J. WEISTART & C. LOWELL, supra note
16, at § 8.12.
41. The old view of sports or recreation injuries is characterized by Judge Cardozo in
Murphy v. Steeplechase Amusement Co., 250 N.Y. 479, 166 N.E. 173 (1929).
Volenti nonfit injitria. One who takes part in such a sport accepts the dangers that
inhere in it so far as they are obvious and necessary, just as a fencer accepts the risk
of a thrust by his antagonist or a spectator at a ball game the chance of contact with
the ball.
Id at 482, 116 N.E. at 174. Cf. Thomas v. Barlow, 5 N.J. Misc. 764, 138 A.208 (1927) (Plaintiff
could not recover damages on assault and battery theory when struck by defendant's fist dur-
ing basketball game).
42. In addition to the tort theories, professional and amateur athletes have been indicted
on criminal charges for injuries inflicted during games. Criminal liability for sports injuries is
outside the scope of Hackbart and this note. Most of the criminal charges have been tried in
Canadian courts. Compare Regina v. Watson, 26 C.C.C. (2d) 150 (1975) (defendant convicted
of criminal assault for rendering a hockey opponent unconscious by gripping him around the
neck after the victim had inadvertently struck defendant with his stick on a preceding play)
with Regina v. Green, [1971] 16 D.L.R.3d 137 (Ont. Crim. Div. 1970), and Regina v. Maki,
[1971] 14 D.L.R.3d 164 (Ont. Crim. Div. 1970) (defendants Green and Maki, professional
hockey players with National Hockey League franchises, both acquitted of assault charges
stemming from a brutal altercation at the Ottowa Civic Center).
A fight between Dave Forbes, formerly of the Boston Bruins, and Henry Boucha resulted
in the first criminal trial of a professional athlete in the United States for injuries inflicted
during a game. In that incident, Forbes jammed the end of his stick into Boucha's right eye,
leaving Boucha, after surgery, with impaired vision. See State v. Forbes, No. 63280 (Minn.
Dist. Ct., judgment of mistrial entered, Aug. 12, 1975).
For a discussion of criminal liability for sports injuries, see generally Hechter, supra note
19; L6tourneau & Manganas, Violence in Sports- Eidentiary Problems in Criminal Prosecu-
tions, 16 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 577 (1978); Comment, The Consent Defense. Sports, Violence
lies in assault and battery. The defendant in a battery action is liable
if he commits an act, intending to cause a harmful or offensive con-
tact, and such contact results.43 The elements of battery can usually
be established when a fight occurs during a sporting activity," but
defendants generally are able to elude liability by proffering the de-
fense45 of consent.46
An early decision, Gibeline v. Smith,47 established a presump-
tion that adults who voluntarily engage in play consent to bodily
contacts inherent in the game.48 This presumption has been modi-
fied by the Restatement (Second) of Torts, which only recognizes the
consent defense to assault and battery for conduct within the rules
and customs of the game.49
The second and third tort theories, negligence and reckless mis-
conduct, 50 are closely related; consequently, plaintiffs plead both
these theories when the tort appears to be unintentional. Negligence
is conduct that falls below the standard of care established by law for
the protection of others from unreasonable risks.5' This standard, or
duty, is based on the actions of an ordinary, reasonable person under
and the Criminal Law, 13 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 235 (1975); Comment, Violence in Professional
Sports, 1975 Wisc. L. REV. 771.
. The discussion of the tort theories in this note is necessarily limited. For further clarifica-
tion of the elements and interpretations of civil assault and battery, negligence, and reckless
misconduct, see generally F. HARPER & F. JAMES, THE LAW OF TORTS §§ 3.1-.5, 16 (1956); W.
PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS §§ 9, 30-34 (4th ed. 1971); 42 Mo. L. REV. 347 (1977).
43. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 13 (1965).
44. For a demonstration of the unpredictable results achieved by courts in the applica-
tion of assault and battery theory to sports, compare Griggas v. Clauson, 6 Ill. App. 2d 412,
128 N.E.2d 363 (1955) (amateur basketball player prevailed on assault and battery theory for
injuries sustained when he received a blow delivered by his opponent in a moment of anger)
with Thomas v. Barlow, 5 N.J. Misc. 764, 138 A. 208 (1927) (injured basketball player denied
recovery on assault and battery theory for broken jaw caused by an opponent's fist).
45. Strictly speaking, consent is not a "defense" to intentional torts. Instead, consent
"goes to negative the existence of any tort in the first instance." W. PROSSER, supra note 42, at
§ 18. See also id at § 18 n.29.
46. The consent defense to intentional torts is comparable to consent as a defense to
criminal assault and battery charges. Both matters are beyond the scope of this note. On
consent in the tort context, see McAdams v. Windham, 208 Ala. 492, 94 So. 742 (1922) (de-
fendant not liable when unknown heart defect caused death of opponent boxer); Hellriegel v.
Tholl, 69 Wash. 2d 97, 417 P.2d 362 (1966) (plaintiff denied recovery for broken neck sus-
tained when after daring friends to throw him in the lake, they complied). W. PROSSER supra
note 42, at § 18.
For a discussion of consent as criminal defense, see generally R. PERKINS, CRIMINAL LAW
109 (2d ed. 1969); Puttkammer, Consent in CriminalAssault, 19 ILL. L. REV. 617 (1925); An-
not., 7 A.L.R.2d 704 (1949).
47. 106 Mo. App. 545, 80 S.W. 961 (1904).
48. Id at 546, 80 S.W. at 962. Plaintiff and defendant, who were usually friends, became
engaged in a scuffle in plaintiff's tavern after defendant called plaintiff "punceon" (Italian for
"big belly"). The court found the scuffle to be "friendly," and therefore, when plaintiff was
thrown against a show case, breaking two ribs, he could not recover damages from his partner
in play.
49. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 50, Comment b (1965).
50. Treatises and courts also refer to reckless misconduct as "recklessness" and "wanton
and willful misconduct."
51. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 282 (1965).
similar circumstances.52
Early sports cases limited recovery to intentional torts: recovery
on a negligence theory was "out of the question."53 Contemporary
courts have uniformly recognized the negligence cause of action and
have, therefore, sustained claims for golf,54 fishing,55 softball,56 and
soccer 57 injuries.
Reckless misconduct, the third tort theory, is a hybrid of assault
and battery and negligence. Like assault and battery, reckless mis-
conduct requires proof of intent. Under the reckless misconduct the-
ory, however, the requisite intent is to commit the act, rather than to
cause the particular harm.58
A reckless misconduct cause of action exists when an actor
knows his act is harmful, but fails to appreciate the extent of the
potential harm. It is in this respect that reckless misconduct and neg-
ligence theories vary subtly.59 While one species of negligence may
consist of mere inadvertence or incompetence, reckless misconduct
requires a conscious election of the course of action by the actor,
with knowledge that danger is present.6" The second type of negli-
gence consists of intentionally placing another person at risk. In
comparison, to be deemed "reckless," the actor must recognize that
his behavior will generate a risk in excess of the risk of a negligent
act.6'
The tort concept of assumption of risk6 2 is the nemesis of in-
52. Id § 283.
53. See Thomas v. Barlow, 5 N.J. Misc. 764, 138 A. 208 (1927); 26 MICH. L. REV. 322
(1927).
54. Compare Thomas v. Shaw, 217 Ga. 688, 124 S.E.2d 396 (1962) (plaintiff-golfer recov-
ered for loss of 96% of his vision in left eye against another golfer who negligently failed to
warn plaintiff after hitting an errant golf shot) with Rose v. Morris, 97 Ga. App. 764, 104
S.E.2d 485 (1959) (defendant not liable for failing to warn other golfers before making his
shot).
55. See Hawayek v. Simmons, 91 So. 2d 49 (La. App. 1956) (recovery granted to a fisher-
man who sustained injuries to his eye caused by a fellow fisherman's hook and lure). The
court stated, "While one who becomes part of a fishing venture might be said to assume all
ordinary and normal hazards incident to the sport, the law does not require him to assume all
risks of negligence of those other persons in the fishing party." Id at 54-55.
56. See, e.g., Niemczyk v. Burleson, 538 S.W.2d 737 (Mo. Ct. App. 1976) (plaintiff-
baserunner recovered for injuries sustained in collision with shortstop who blocked the run-
ner's basepath).
57. See, e.g., Moore v. Jones, 120 Ga. App. 521, 171 S.E.2d 390 (1969) (court denied
defendant's motion for summary judgment because injury caused by defendant's willful and
wanton negligence). See also Nabozny v. Barnhill, 31 Ill. App. 3d 212, 334 N.E.2d 258 (1975).
58. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 500, Comment f (1965).
59. For a decisional distinction between negligence and reckless misconduct theories, see
Nichols v. Bresnahan, 357 Mo. 1126, 1130, 212 S.W.2d 570, 573 (1948).
60. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 500, Comment g (1965).
61. Id
62. For detailed discussions of the assumption of risk doctrine, see generally F. HARPER
& F. JAMES, supra note 42, at § 21; W. PROSSER, supra note 42, at § 67; H. STEVENSON, LAW
OF NEGLIGENCE IN THE ATLANTIC STATES (1954).
Stevenson capsulized the assumption of risk concept in the sports context: "One may not
760
jured athletes who assert negligence or reckless misconduct claims. 63
In the abstract, assumption of risk holds that a party who freely en-
gages with others in dangerous activities cannot recover if harm re-
sults. 64 This theory is not absolute;65 two elements must be satisfied.
The participant must make a voluntary choice of conduct,66 and he
must have knowledge and appreciation of the risk.67
Frequently, a finding of lack of knowledge of the risk has per-
mitted recovery by injured amateur athletes. Courts hold that an
actor does not assume a risk unless he both knows that the risk exists
and appreciates its unreasonable character.68 In sports, however,
players only assume risks that are a foreseeable or inherent part of
the game.6 9 Accordingly, ice skaters who fall might expect another
engage in a game and then complain of such characteristic incidents as give it the desired zest."
Id at 587.
63. See, e.g., Richmond v. Employers' Fire Ins. Co., 298 So. 2d 118 (La. App. 1974)
(college baseball player assumes the risk that he might be hit with a "fungo bat" slipping from
coach's hands); McGee v. Board of Educ. of N.Y., 16 App. Div. 2d 99, 226 N.Y.S.2d 329
(1962) (high school baseball coach assumed the risk that he might be hit on the head by a
thrown ball).
For cases upholding the assumption of risk doctrine in football, see, e.g., Whipple v. Sal-
vation Army, 261 Ore. 453, 495 P.2d 739 (1972) (young football player assumes the risk that
his knee might be injured when he is tackled simultaneously by four opponents): Vendrell v.
School Dist., Malheur County, 233 Ore. 1, 376 P.2d 406 (1962) (high school football player
assumes the risk that he might suffer neck injuries when using his head to ward off potential
tacklers). See generally J. WEISTART & C. LOWELL, supra note 16, at § 8.02.
64. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 496A (1965). "A plaintiff who voluntarily as-
sumes a risk of harm arising from the negligent or reckless conduct of the defendant cannot
recover for such harm." 1d
65. In fact, many jurisdictions do not recognize assumption of risk as a tort defense, or
only recognize the defense in limited cases. See, e.g., Parker v. Redden, 421 S.W.2d 586 (Ky.
1967) (abolished assumption of risk); Felgner v. Anderson, 375 Mich. 23, 133 N.W.2d 136
(1965) (assumption of risk defense only when an employment contract relation exists); Brosor
v. Sullivan, 99 N.H. 305, 109 A.2d 862 (1954) (defense not available unless express contract
present); McGrath v. American Cyanimid Co., 41 N.J. 272, 196 A.2d 238 (1963) (assumption
of risk should be banished). See generally F. HARPER & F. JAMES, supra note 42, at § 21.8
(assumption of risk adds nothing to modem law except confusion); Lambert, Tort Law and
Participant Sports: The Line Between Vigor and Violence, 4 J. CONTEMP. L. 211, 216 (1978).
66. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 496E (1965).
Participation in a game, however, is not always "voluntary." See, e.g., Martini v. Oly-
phant Borough School Dist., 83 Pa. D. & C. 206 (C.P. Lack. 1952), in which the court ob-
served,
It is also debatable as to whether or not the usual disciplinary authority of the coach,
the pressure of school spirit, the probable odium attached to a refusal to play, both by
his fellow-players and his schoolmates, might not have robbed him of volition under
the circumstances. We think the question is one to be decided by a trial judge or jury
as the facts may require after the evidence is in.
Id at 211.
67. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 496D (1965).
68. Id comment c.
The standard to be applied is a subjective one, of what the particular plaintiff in fact
sees, knows, understands and appreciates. In this it differs from the objective stan-
dard which is applied to contributory negligence. . . . If by reason of age, or lack of
information, experience, intelligence, or judgment, the plaintiff does not understand
the risk involved in a known situation, he will not be taken to assume the risk.
Id
69. One who takes part in a sport accepts its inherent risks so far as they are obvious and
necessary. Murphy v. Steeplechase Amusement Co., 250 N.Y. 479, 482, 166 N.E. 173, 174, 231
N.Y.S. 826, 826 (1929). Accord, Carroll v. Askew, 119 Ga. 688, 166 S.E.2d 635 (1969) (golfer
skater to hit them.7" Similarly, baseball players must bear the risk of
flying bats7' and balls.72
The obscure boundary between assumed and extraordinary
risks is best illustrated in Tavernier v. Maes7 3 and Bourque v.
Duplechin,74 both baseball cases involving "double play"75 attempts
at second base. The second baseman in Tavernier was held to have
assumed the risk that a sliding runner would injure him.7 6 The court
in Bourque, however, ruled that the runner was liable for injuries
when he departed from the normal base path to intimidate the plain-
tiff-second baseman and avert a double play.77
The rationale in Bourque78 is characteristic of a tendency to-
ward basing the athlete's duty of care upon the internal rules of the
sport.79 When the rules of softball, for example, forbade an infielder
to block a runner's line of travel, recovery was granted 80 in a negli-
gence action against the rule violator. Reckless misconduct claims
have been decided utilizing this "rules" analysis. In the leading
does not assume risk that another golfer will negligently take a practice swing that will'strike
him in the eye); Shurley v. Hoskins, 271 So. 2d 439 (Miss. 1973) (hunter does not assume risk
that he will be shot by a negligent hunting companion); Page v. Unterreiner, - Mo. App. _
106 S.W.2d 528 (1937) (golf caddy does not assume risk of being hit by golfer's errant shot);
Arnold v. Schmeiser, 34 App. Div. 2d 568, 309 N.Y.S.2d 699 (1970) (participant in "fireman's
chair" - one person tossed in air and caught by others - does not assume risk that hurlers will
walk away rather than catch player); Nepstad v. Randall, 82 S.D. 615, 152 N.W.2d 383 (1967)
(rider on hood of golf cart does not assume risk that driver will turn sharply without first
slowing the cart).
70. Compare Moe v. Steenberg, 275 Minn. 448, 147 N.W.2d 587 (1966) (plaintiff-skater
should have realized that, if she fell, others might be unable to avoid falling on her) with
Schamel v. St. Louis Arena Corp., 324 S.W.2d 375 (Mo. Ct. App. 1959) (plaintiff assumes risk
of clumsiness, but not of misconduct by other skating patrons).
71. See, e.g., Benedetto v. Travelers Ins. Co., 172 So. 2d 354 (La. 1965); Gaspard v.
Grain Dealers Mut. Ins. Co., 131 So. 2d 831 (La. 1961); Gordon v. Deer Park School Dist., 71
Wash. 2d 119, 426 P.2d 824 (1967).
72. See, e.g., Mann v. Nutrilite, Inc., 136 Cal. App. 2d 729, 289 P.2d 282 (1955) (plaintiff
struck by thrown ball denied recovery); Dudley v. William Penn College, 219 N.W.2d 484
(Iowa 1974) (plaintiff struck by batted ball while on bench denied recovery).
73. 242 Cal. App. 2d 532, 51 Cal. Rptr. 575 (1966).
74. 331 So. 2d 40 (La. App. 1976).
75. In baseball, a double play is made when, with an opponent runner on first base, a
ground ball is fielded, thrown to the second baseman or shortstop who touches second base
and relays the ball to first base in time to beat the batter. Often, the opponent runner will
collide with the second baseman or shortstop in an attempt to force an errant throw to first
base.
76. 242 Cal. App. 2d at 553, 51 Cal. Rptr. at 588.
77. 331 So. 2d at 42.
78. Under the rules of both baseball and softball, a runner may not depart from the
designated base path.
79. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 50 (1965) recognizes the importance of rules
and customs of a sport in the assessment of duty and liability.
Taking part in a game manifests a willingness to submit to such bodily contacts or
restrictions of liberty as are permitted by its rules or usages. Participating in such a
game does not manifest consent to contacts which are prohibited by rules or usages of
the game if such rules or usages are designed to protect the participants and not
merely to secure the better playing of the game as a test of skill.
Id comment b.
80. Niemczyk v. Bureleson, 538 S.W.2d 737 (Mo. Ct. App. 1976).
case,"' Nabozny v. Barnhill,2 the court awarded damages to a soccer
goalkeeper who was kicked in the head by an opponent in obvious
violation of the rules of the game. 3 The court in Nabozny an-
nounced a test for ascertaining the existence of a duty. This legal
duty arises 4 when the teams involved in the sport are trained and
coached by knowledgeable personnel, a recognized set of rules gov-
erns the competition, and the injury is caused by the violation of a
safety rule. 5
In Hackbart, plaintiff advanced negligence and reckless miscon-
duct claims.8 6 Because the parties agreed to separate the liability is-
sue from the causation and damages inquiries, 7 the district court
examined only the narrow question of whether the tenets of tort lia-
bility should apply to professional football players.
Faced with this policy issue, the district court ignored the deci-
sional law developed in the parallel field of amateur sports,88 opting
to discuss the nature of the professional football industry. Both the
parties and the court conceded that Clark's act was not consistent
with community standards of conduct and, therefore, would have
generated civil and possibly criminal 9 liability had it not occurred
on a football field.90
The district court justified this apparent aberration by highlight-
ing the intense emotional level that pervades a professional football
contest. Motivated by the pregame psychological preparation by
their coaches9' and the noise of the spectators,92 these naturally com-
81. Shortly after the decision, Nabozny v. Barnhill, 31 I11. App. 2d 212, 334 N.E.2d 258
(1975), became the subject of commentary. 42 Mo. L. REV. 347 (1977); 45 UMKC 119 (1976).
82. 31 111. App. 2d 212, 334 N.E.2d 258 (1975).
83. The F.I.F.A. rules of soccer were in force during the game in Nabozny. The rules
prohibited all players from making contact, albeit unintentional, with the goalkeeper when the
goalkeeper is in possession of the ball in the designated "penalty area." Id at 214, 334 N.E.2d
at 260.
84. Id
85. Safety rules have been distinguished by the courts from rules of play. Safety rules are
adopted and enforced to protect players from injuries. Another set of rules exists, however, to
regulate the actual conduct of the game. In football, for example, a "grabbing the facemask"
penalty is imposed to protect players from resultant injuries. Encroachment, on the other
hand, is a rule in force to prevent premature movement and enhance the flow of the game. See
generally OFFICIAL RULES FOR PROFESSIONAL FOOTBALL, supra note 10.
86. An action for assault and battery was precluded by the Colorado statute of limita-
tions. 6 COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-80-102 (1973). "Actions barred in one year. All actions for
assault and battery, false imprisonment, slander and libel shall be commenced within one year
after the cause of action accrues, and not afterward." (emphasis added).
87. 435 F. Supp. at 353.
88. See notes 47-85 and accompanying text supra.
89. The court concluded, "It [Clark's act] would involve a criminal sanction if the requi-
site intent were present." Id at 358.
90. Id at 357-58.
91. According to the testimony of Denver Broncos coach (in 1973) John Ralston, the
coaching staff of his team sought to achieve the same level of emotional intensity before a
game that would be present if the player was about to confront a man who had just attempted
to force his family's car off the edge of a mountain road. Id at 355.
petitive athletes frequently engage in fighting.93 Notably, the court
rejected the Nabozny "rules test," stating,
The difficulty with that view as applied to professional football is
that to decide which restraints should be made applicable is a task
for which the courts are not well suited. There is no discemable
code of conduct for NFL players. . . . The NFL has substituted
the morality of the battlefield for that of the playing field, and the"restraints of civilization" have been left on the sidelines. 94
Because injuries and hospitalization frequently occur in profes-
sional football, the court concluded that it was "wholly incongru-
ous"95 to talk about a player's duty to care for the safety of his
adversary. Having determined that both negligence and reckless
misconduct require the existence of a "duty," the court found no
cause of action would lie. Additionally, it was postulated that even if
a duty existed, the assumption of risk defense would frustrate
Hackbart's recovery."
On appeal, plaintiff claimed that the district court erred in refus-
ing to acknowledge a cause of action merely because of the situs of
the alleged tort.9 7 The court of appeals reversed the district court
based on three significant grounds: First, the court used jurisdic-
tional parlance to criticize the manifest abdication by the district
court in refusing to hear the merits of an injured party's claim. The
court surveyed three rules of jurisdiction that might justify such a
refusal: the "political question" exception;98 the abstention doc-
trine;99 and the discretion permitted by the law of the forum state in
a diversity action."° The court concluded that none of these excep-
tions applied to the facts at bar.' As a counterpoise to the district
court's policy justification for the exclusion of professional athletes
from tort law, the appellate court resorted to the fundamental policy
considerations articulated in Marbury v. Madison. 102 "The very es-
sence of civil liberty certainly consists in the right of every individual
92. The court notes that while many spectators appreciate individual and team display of
skills, the appeal of football or others is the "spectacle of savagery." Id.
93. Id
94. Id at 358.
95. Id at 356.
96. Id
97. 601 F.2d at 524.
98. As announced in Louisiana v. Texas, 176 U.S. 1 (1900), the Supreme Court cannot
take original jurisdiction over controversies concerning political questions that are not the sub-
ject of judicial cognizance. Id at 23.
99. For a concise explanation of the abstention doctrine, see American Trial Lawyers
Ass'n v. New Jersey Supreme Court, 409 U.S. 467 (1973). See also England v. Louisiana State
Bd. of Medical Examiners, 375 U.S. 411 (1964); Harrison v. NAACP, 360 U.S. 167 (1959).
100. 601 F.2d at 523-24. The circuit court noted provisions of the Colorado Constitution
that defeat the diversity discretion argument. See COLO. CoNST. art. 2, § 7; COLO. CONST. art.
6, § 9 ("The district courts ... shall have original jurisdiction in all civil, probate, and crimi-
nal cases.") (emphasis added). The courts of Colorado have liberally construed the constitu-
tional sections granting jurisdiction. See Cruz v. Morley, 77 Colo. 25, 234 P. 178 (1924).
101. 601 F.2d at 522, 524.
102. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
to claim the protection of the law, whenever he received an injury.
One of the first duties of government is to afford that protection."'' 03
In its second stage of analysis, the court rejected the situs-ori-
ented boundary of liability, opting instead for a boundary based on
conduct, and circumscribed by the rules of the game. Using this per-
spective, the circuit court found support in the evidence for the con-
clusion that defendant's conduct was "not an accepted part of the
playing rules or the general customs of the game."" The aggrieved
party, therefore, should be entitled to relief, regardless of the loca-
tion of the incident.
This "rules and conduct" focus is also evident in the court's
treatment of the third point: the substantive basis for liability. After
distinguishing the three tort theories, the court opined that reckless
misconduct was an appropriate standard.0 5 Application of the neg-
ligence theory was declared unsuitable because Clark's act-al-
though not the resultant harm-was intended, rather than
inadvertant.
The circuit court did not announce a decision on the assumption
of risk defense. Nevertheless, the bench indicated its disbelief that
even a highly competitive professional athlete would consent to "in-
juries caused by conduct not within the rules."'"
Having taken the initial step by recognizing civil liability of pro-
fessional athletes, the court will undoubtedly be called upon to de-
fine the extent of the duty owed. Clearly, the duty of one
professional athlete for a co-combatant's safety is not the same as the
duty of one "reasonable man" to another. To say he has no duty,
however, is an unjustified aberration from the philosophy of tort law
that will indulge brutality in the NFL and in other professional con-
tact sports. Hockey-conscious Canadians have become aware of the
consequences of excessive violence in sports, 0 7 and their courts now
103. Id at 163.
104. 601 F.2d at 520.
105. The court, however, did not determine that Clark's act was not assault and battery.
Instead, it was held that reckless misconduct could be regarded as a "lesser included act." Id.
at 524. Actual liability was left for the district court to determine on remand. The circuit court
did indicate, though, that reckless misconduct "fits perfectly the fact situation here." Id. at
525.
106. 601 F.2d at 520.
107. Canadian youth hockey league officials have become concerned over the extent to
which professional athlete emulation has translated into a startling increase in violence and
injuries in youth sports. See ONTARIO PROVINCE COMMISSION ON AMATEUR HOCKEY, IN-
QUIRY INTO VIOLENCE IN AMATEUR HOCKEY (1975); Miller, Courage and Fear in a Vortex of
Violence, TIME, Feb. 24, 1975, at 54.
American pediatritions are likewise concerned. A so-called "Evil Knievel Syndrome" has
been recognized among children, characterized by imitation of the exhibitionism in sports.
"Televised violence .. .especially during sporting events and news reporting is increasingly
implicated in imitative and aggressive behavior exhibited by children." Kanfer, supra note 37,
at 64.
The increase in violent acts among spectators at sporting events is also said to be a reac-
recognize civil and criminal °8 limits to physical contacts on the
ice.109 The recognition of potential civil liability by the Tenth Cir-
cuit is a bold decision, worthy of adherence.
The rules test of Nabozny, with some refinement, could be ap-
plied to ascertain the standard of care for professional athletes. Al-
though a jury of nonathletes would be hampered in perceiving the
standard," 0  the duty of care should be based on the behavior of a
"reasonable professional player." Fundamental to this standard is
the presumption that a reasonable player abides by the rules and
customs of the game. Contrary to the opinion of the district court in
Hackbart, the rules of the NFL are explicit in proscribing player
conduct."' One problem with the Nabozny test, however, is ascer-
taining those rules that are safety-oriented. Modifying the test to ex-
clude from liability purely accidental and unavoidable conduct is
also difficult. The stated concern of the district court over unde-
tected rule violations,"12 however, is not a problem. Conduct that is
tion to violence on the field. Yeager, The Savage State of Sports, PHYSICIAN AND SPORTS-
MEDICINE, May 1977, at 96.
108. See note 42 supra.
109. The Canadian standard for the imposition of civil liability upon athletes is based on
the actor's conduct, rather than situs. See, e.g., Agar v. Canning, 54 W.W.R. (n.s.) 302 (Man.
Q.B.) (1965), 7f'd, 55 W.W.R. (n.s.) 384 (C.A.) (1966). In Agar, a negligence action was
brought against a hockey player who struck an opponent in the face with his hockey stick. The
court held that even a retaliatory blow went beyond the immunity conferred upon hockey
players:
The conduct of a player in the heat of the game is instinctive and unpremeditated
and should not be judged by standards suited to polite social intercourse.
But a little reflection will establish that some limit must be placed on a player's im-
munity from liability. Each case must be decided on its own facts so it is difficult, if
not impossible, to decide how the line is to be drawn in every circumstance. But
injuries inflicted in circumstances which show a definite resolve to cause serious in-
jury to another, even when there is provocation and in the heat of the game, should
not fall within the scope of implied consent.
54 W.W.R. (n.s.) at 304. See generally Hechter, supra note 19.
110. On September 12, 1976, George Atkinson, a defensive safety for the Oakland Raiders
football team, was involved in a tackle in which Lynn Swann, a pass receiver for the Pitts-
burgh Steelers, received a concussion. Subsequently, Steelers' coach Chuck Noll stated that
Atkinson was part of a "criminal element" in professional football. Atkinson sued Noll for
slander. At the trial, films of Atkinson's aggressive playing style were shown as evidence. The
jury of four women and two men indicated that they had extreme difficulty in relating to the
extent of physical contact that is common-place in professional football. See Johnson, .4 Walk
on the Sordid Side, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, Aug. 1, 1977, at 1I.
11. See OFFICIAL RULES FOR PROFESSIONAL FOOTBALL, supra note 10. Rule 12 estab-
lishes rules of conduct for players. Among the acts proscribed by Rule 12 are certain uses of
the hands, arms, and body as well as personal fouls between players. Also contained in Rule
12 is a prohibition against eleven specific acts of "unsportsmanlike conduct." Id at Rule 12,
§ 2, art. 15.
112. 435 F. Supp. at 354. The district court rejected the rules approach to assigning liabil-
ity because of the belief that the rules are not specific, see note 117 supra, and that the rules are
sporadically enforced. The court stated:
The written rules are difficult to understand and, because of the speed and violence of
the game, their application is often a matter of subjective evaluation of the circum-
stances. Officials differ with each other in their rulings.
Many violations of the rules do occur during each game. Ordinarily each team re-
ceives several yardage penalties, but many fouls go undetected or undeclared by the
officials.
proven to be outside the rules, whether detected by the game officials
or not, would be actionable.
The policy issue before the courts in Hackbart is challenging,
especially in light of the public feeling toward sports and sportsmen.
Violence in professional sports has reached a critical level. The deci-
sion in Hackbart was not made by judges blind to the realities of
contemporary professional football. The alternatives to judicial in-
tervention are inherently inadequate to deal effectively with the cri-
sis. Sports violence appeals to the spectators. Therefore,
legislators" 3 will not be pressured to enact state sports regulations or
create sports commissions." 4 Professional leagues will resist chang-
ing the nature of a successful sport. An individual player who re-
fuses to play football in an aggressive manner places a college
scholarship or lucrative professional career in jeopardy. Coaches are
likewise reluctant to abandon successful coaching philosophies that
place a premium on aggressive play." 5 Coaches urge players to
avoid rule violations, but their purpose is to prevent the loss of
yardage, rather than to protect opponents.' "6 Meanwhile, the team
owners, who comprise the voting membership of the leagues, attempt
to maximize profits by satisfying the fans and hiring successful
coaches. " 7 Faced with this scenario, the appellate court in Hackbart
realized self-regulation is unlikely.
The social policy decision of the Tenth Circuit is clear: in the
absence of meaningful self-regulation, this court will impose com-
mon-law rules to stem the tide of needless sports injuries. The court
recognized that the tort cause of action is not a panacea: the param-
eters of an athlete's conduct are subject to dispute. Faced with the
Id at 354-55.
113. The district court in Hackbart regarded the regulation of professional athletics to be
a function of the legislature. Therefore, the court would not recognize Hackbart's cause of
action. "If there is to be any governmental involvement in this industry, it is a matter which
can be best considered by the legislative branch." Id. at 358.
The respondents to a public opinion poll, conducted by Mid-Continent Surveys of Minne-
apolis, Minnesota shortly after the conclusion of the Forbes case, see note 42 supra, preferred
league discipline over court punishment 60% to 26% (5% recommending both sanctions). Hal-
lowell & Meshbesher, supra note 37, at 28.
114. "This approach [sports commissions) would give primary review of sports-related
matters to a regulatory board and provide for criminal sanction through referral of extreme
cases only as a last resort." Hallowell & Meshbesher, supra note 37, at 32.
115. The trial testimony of both head coaches revealed to the court that "aggressiveness is
the primary attribute which they sought in the selection of players." 435 F. Supp. at 356. For
more detailed exposition of professional and college coaching philosophies, see Underwood,
supra note 30, at 70-82; Patton ofthe Puck, TIME, Jan. 6, 1975 at 71 (the coaching philosophy
of Fred Shero, then professional hockey coach for Philadelphia Flyers).
116. 435 F. Supp. at 356.
117. Dave Forbes, see note 42 supra, was recently hired as an assistant coach with the
Birmingham Dusters of the American Hockey League. The Patriot (Harrisburg, Pa.), Oct. 4,
1979, at 29, col. 4. Although Forbes was acquitted of the criminal charges, he carries the
reputation of an over-aggressive player. The hiring of such former players as coaches of inex-
perienced players is, arguably, indicative of the inability or unwillingness of teams and leagues
to regulate themselves.
choice between an imperfect response and no response at all, how-
ever, the appellate court accepted its duty to apply the law to the
controversy.
From the public's perspective the imposition of civil penalties
on professional athletes is more objectionable than the encroach-
ment of the law into business and management aspects of sports be-
cause the possible civil sanctions may alter the manner in which the
game is played." 8 Although any novel cause of action tends to gen-
erate additional litigation, the unique facts of Hackbart"9 and the
potential increase in self-regulation and self-restraint should offset
the feared flood of professional sports injury claims.
While the Hackbart decision is significant for its recognition of
potential liability of professional athletes, the decision fails to devise
or endorse a test for future proceedings. Accordingly, subsequent
decisions must still face the task of distinguishing a professional ath-
lete's duty from that of an amateur athlete or reasonable man.
118. Without an announced standard, it is impossible to project the effect of potential civil
liability. Some athletes may quit playing rather than risk personal liability. A less violent
game, however, would attract more participants. Similarly, NFL rules could be made more
strict to decrease the likelihood of injuries. To the contrary, however, if the court's analysis
requires a rule violation before imposing liability, the rules might be liberalized to avoid that
consequence. On a psychological level, the imposition of standard tort law principles may
diminish the escapist appeal of sports to the general public. See Koppett, supra note 18.
119. Three facts in 1lackbart are unlikely to occur frequently. First, Clark's act was obvi-
ous and easily substantiated. Second, the act was an overt violation of the rules. Last, and
most significant, the waiver signed by Hackbart meant he was denied the recovery contractu-
ally provided to other players. Accordingly, these other players would have no need to resort
to litigation. [Casenote by Glenn R. Grell]
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION - SUICIDE--COMPENSIBLE IF
THE RESULT OF AN INDUSTRIAL INJURY CAUSING PAIN AND
DEPRESSION SUFFICIENT TO IMPAIR THE WORKER'S NORMAL
THOUGHT PROCESS. Delaware Tire Center v. Fox, 401 A.2d 97
(Del. Super. Ct. 1979), afid, 411 A.2d 606 (Del. 1980).
In Delaware Tire Center v. Fox,' the Superior Court of Dela-
ware sustained the Industrial Accident Board's award of death bene-
fits to the dependents of an employee who committed suicide.2 In
reaching this decision, the court concluded that the provision of the
Delaware Workmen's Compensation Act 3 that bars recovery for an
employee's "wilful intention to bring about the injury or death of
himself or another, ' 4 is inapplicable when an employee suffers a
compensible injury causing pain and despair of "such a degree as to
impair normal thought process," 5 rendering him incapable of form-
ing a wilful intention to take his own life.
Earl A. Fox, Jr., suffered a compensible industrial accident6 on
April 13, 1973. In February 1977, Fox was referred to Dr. Wein-
traub by his treating physician to determine whether Fox's pain,
which prevented him from returning to work, might be partially
caused by psychological factors. Dr. Weintraub testified that his ex-
1. 401 A.2d 97 (Del. Super. Ct. 1979), arj'd, 411 A.2d 606 (Del. 1980).
2. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 19, § 2330 (1974). The Industrial Accident Board also
granted the decedent's claims for unpaid medical expenses under DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 19,
§ 2332 (1974); medical witness fees under DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 19, § 2322(e) (1974); and rea-
sonable attorneys fees under DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 19, § 2127(a) (1974).
3. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 19, §§ 2301-2397 (1974).
4. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 19, § 2353 (1974). Pertinent portions of the statute provide as
follows:
Forfeiture of Right to Compensation ...
(b) If any employee be injured as a result of his intoxication, because of his deliberate
and reckless indifference to danger, because of his wilful intention to bring about the
injury or death of himself or of another, because of his wilful failure or refusal to use a
reasonable safety appliance provided for him or to perform a duty required by stat-
ute, he shall not be entitled to recover damages in an action at law or to compensa-
tion or medical, dental, optometric, chiropractice or hospital service under the
compensatory provisions of this chapter. The burden of proof under this subsection
shall be on the employer.
Id (emphasis added).
5. 401 A.2d at 100.
6. The initial job related injury and the specific facts relating to the compensible acci-
dent are not discussed by the court. Court records, however, indicate that Earl A. Fox fell
from a ladder during the course of his employment as a "tire changer" and sustained the
following injuries: broken left arm, disfigurement of neck, disfigurement of left shoulder and
left eye, and severe contusions. Petition to Determine Compensation Due to Dependents of
Deceased Employee, (October 5, 1979) Del. Super. Ct., File No. 89-179, docket No. 3.
aminations disclosed that Fox's injury had induced an "exaggerated
depression"7 that was caused by the pain he was suffering and his
inability to return to work. Dr. Weintraub concluded that Fox's
mental condition precluded his ability to reason clearly. It was Dr.
Weintraub's opinion that the compensible injury was "a cause"
8 of
Fox's "acute respiratory failure"9 caused by a self-inflicted, multi-
drug overdose on June 8, 1977. Despite his testimony that Fox's rea-
soning was impaired, Dr. Weintraub testified that the decedent had
the mental capacity to commit suicide "willingly and knowingly."'"
The Industrial Accident Board's award of benefits" was based
upon its finding that the suicide was the result of an uncontrollable
impulse resulting from decedent's "state of continuous pain coupled
with anxiety and depression"' 2 that deprived the decedent of the
ability to understand and appreciate the consequences of his act.
The superior court affirmed the findings as based upon substantial
evidence.
The Delaware Workmen's Compensation Act contains a section
that prohibits the recovery of workmen's compensation benefits re-
sulting from an employee's "wilful intention to bring about the in-
jury of himself or another."' 3 Workmen's compensation statutes in
forty-two other states contain similar provisions.' 4 Several theories
7. 401 A.2d at 99.
8. Dr. Weintraub further testified that Fox had suffered, "before and after the accident,
from depression, anxiety and a feeling of being incapable of fulfilling the responsibility of
providing for his family." Id. Decedent Fox also had a history of problems with alcohol and
had previously attempted to take his life in 1975. Id
9. Id
10. Id The court in a later portion of the opinion states that Dr. Weintraub testified that
Fox possessed the capacity to commit suicide "wilfully and knowingly." Id at 100.
11. The pertinent portions of the Industrial Accident Board's Findings of Fact and Con-
clusions of Law state as follows:
CONCLUSIONS OF FACT AND RULINGS OF LAW
Based upon the testimony presented and the evidence received, the Board makes
the following Conclusions of Fact, which it deems to be based upon substantial and
competent evidence, and Rulings of Law, which follow therefrom....
After a long period of consideration the Board has decided to grant the claim-
ant's petition. Listed below are the reasons for the Board's decision:
(a) The claimant presented the Board with a medical expert, Dr. Irwin G. Wein-
traub who supported the claimant's petition. The employer presented no medical ex.
pert with a contrary viewfor the Board to consider.
(b) Dr. Weintraub did testify that based upon two appointments with the de-
ceased in February of 1977, he had reached the conclusion that there was a direct
connection between the industrial accident of April 13, 1973 and the deceased's
death.
Dr. Weintraub found that when the deceased became emotionally upset that his
ability to reason became greatly impaired . . .The doctor testified that had there been
no industrial accident with resulting pain, there would not have been a suicide.
The doctor told the Board of a history of anxiety and depression before the
deceased's death. The doctor found that the industrial accident was the precpitating
factor that triggered the deceased's suicide.
Brief for Appellant at A-2. Id (emphasis added).
12. 401 A.2d at 99.
13. See note 4 supra.
14. Larson, The Suicide Defense in Workmen's Compensation, 23 BUFFALO L. REV. 43
have been offered as justification for the existence of these provisions
in workmen's compensation statutes. Commentators have argued
that suicide does not arise out of the employment because the source
of the injury is personal and not work related.' 5 Furthermore, be-
cause suicide is the result of an intentional act by the employee, it is
not an accidental injury for the purposes of workmen's compensation
statutes. 16 Moreover, some authorities regard suicide as a serious de-
parture from the scope of the employment 7 and as an independent
cause intervening between the compensible injury and death.' 8
As early as 1915, the Supreme Court of Massachusetts, in In re
Sponatski, 9 recognized that workmen's compensation benefits could
be granted for suicides caused by insanity arising out of an industrial
injury. The rule enunciated in Sponatski requires that as a result of
an industrial injury, the employee must take his life while possessed
by an uncontrollable impulse or in a delirium or frenzy, and the em-
ployee must not be aware of the consequences of his act.2" If, how-
ever, the employee takes his life by the exercise of a "voluntary
wilful choice,"'" his suicide is an independent intervening cause,
even if the choice is the result of a disordered mind.22
(1973). For examples of the wording of various state statutes, see, e.g., intentionally self-in-
flicted injury: CAL. LAB. CODE § 3600 (West 1971); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 34:15-7 (West 1959);
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 77, § 431 (Purdon Supp. 1979). Purposefully self-inflicted injury: ARIZ.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 23-1021 (1971). Wilful intention: IOWA CODE ANN. § 85.16 (West 1949);
MIss. CODE ANN. § 71-3-7 (1972); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-12 (1979); TEX. STAT. ANN. tit. 8306,
§ i (1967). Deliberate intention: OR. REV. STAT. § 656.156(1) (1979); WASH. REV. CODE
§ 51.32.020 (1962). The workmen's compensation statutes of the following states do not con-
tain provisions denying compensation for intentional suicides: Connecticut, Illinois, Michi-
gan, Montana, Nebraska, New Hampshire, and Wyoming. Larson, supra at 43.
15. See, e.g., Larson, supra note 14, at 43 n.1.
16. Id
17. Id. See also Mitrovich, Workmens Compensation for Suicide After Traumatic Injury,
15 CLEV.-MAR. L. REV. 116 (1966).
18. See, e.g., Konazewska v. Erie R.R., 132 N.J.L. 424, 41 A.2d 130 (N.J. Super. Ct.
1945), afl'd, 133 N.J.L. 557, 45 A.2d 315 (N.J. 1946); Blasczak v. Crown Cork & Seal Co., 193
Pa. Super. Ct. 422, 165 A.2d 128 (1960).
The Fox court failed to address the argument that suicide is an intervening cause between
the compensible injury and death, precluding the recovery of workmen's compensation bene-
fits. Other courts applying the chain of causation test, however, have held that if the evidence
shows that "but for" the injury no suicide would have occurred, the suicide is merely an act in
the causal chain and not an independent cause intervening between the injury and the subse-
quent death. Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 97 Ariz. 256, 399 P.2d 664
(1965); Burnight v. Industrial Accident Comm'n, 181 Cal. App. 2d 816, 5 Cal. Rptr. 786 (1960);
Whitehead v. Keene Roofing Co., 43 So. 2d 464 (Fla. 1949); Barber v. Industrial Comm'n, 241
Wis. 462, -, 6 N.W.2d 199, 202 (1942) (Fowler, J., dissenting).
19. 220 Mass. 526, 108 N.E. 466 (1919). Massachusetts no longer follows the Sponatski
rule. In 1937 the Massachusetts Legislature enacted the following provision:
Suicide. Dependents shall not be precluded from recovery under this chapter, nor
shall the insurance company be relieved from making payment to the commonwealth
under section sixty-five, for death by suicide of the employee, if it be shown by the
weight of the evidence that, due to the injury, the employee was of such unsoundness
of mind as to make him irresponsible for his act of suicide.
MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 152, § 26A (West 1958).
20. See generally Larson, supra note 14.
21. 220 Mass. at 527, 108 N.E. at 468.
22. The "voluntary wilful choice test" adopted by the court in In re Sponatski is derived
Numerous jurisdictions have denounced the Sponatski "volun-
tary wilful choice" test.23 One criticism raised by the Fox court is
that the Sponatski rule fails to recognize the effect of pain and de-
pression on the breakdown of an individual's rational thought proc-
ess.2 4 The Fox court noted the tendency of the Sponaiski rule to
grant compensation when the suicidal act is violent or eccentric and
to deny compensation in quiet suicides, despite evidence of unbear-
able pain and agony.25 In addition, the superior court believed the
knowledge element of the Sponatski rule, which closely resembles
the M'Naghten test for criminal insanity, to be inconsistent with the
broad social purposes of the Delaware Workmen's Compensation
Act.2 6 In order to avoid its harsh results, some courts have modified
the Sponatski rule.27 Other courts, including the Fox court, have
adopted the less restrictive "chain of causation" or "causation plus"
approach.28
The traditional chain of causation test was formulated by the
Florida Supreme Court in Whitehead v. Keene Roofing Co.29 If, as
the result of a physical injury, the employee becomes devoid of nor-
mal judgment and dominated by a disturbance of the mind, the em-
ployee's suicide is not considered wilful for the purposes of the
from Daniels v. New York, N.H. & H.R. Co., 183 Mass. 393, 67 N.E. 424 (1903), a tort action.
The Sponatski rule reads as follows:
[The rule] is that where there follows as the direct result of a physical injury an
insanity of such violence as to cause the victim to take his own life through an uncon-
trollable impulse or in a delirium of frenzy "without conscious volition to produce
death, having knowledge of the physical consequences of the act," then there is a
direct and unbroken causal connection between the physical injury and the death.
But where the resulting insanity is such as to cause suicide through a voluntary will-
ful choice determined by a moderately intelligent mental power which knows the
purpose and the physical effect of the suicidal act even though choice is dominated
and ruled by a disordered mind, then there is a new and independent agency which
breaks the chain of causation arising from the injury.
220 Mass. at 527, 108 N.E. at 468.
23. See generally Larson, supra note 14, at 45.
24. 401 A.2d at 99. For cases criticizing the Sponaiski doctrine, see Graver v. Tank &
Mfg. Co., 97 Ariz. 256, 399 P.2d 664 (1965); Rose v. Industrial Comm'n, 8 Ariz. App. 182, 444
P.2d 739 (1968); Burnight v. Industrial Accident Comm'n, 181 Cal. App. 2d 816, 5 Cal. Rptr.
786 (1960); Whitehead v. Keene Roofing Co., 43 So. 2d 464 (Fla. 1949); Petty v. Associated
Transp., Inc., 276 N.C. 417, 173 S.E.2d 321 (1970); Saunders v. Texas Employers Ins. Ass'n,
526 S.W.2d 515 (Tex. Civ. App. 1975); Brenne v. Department of Indus. Labor & Human Rela-
tions, 38 Wis. 2d 84, 156 N.W.2d 497 (1968).
25. See cases cited at note 24 supra. See also 54 TEx. L. REV. 782 (1975).
26. 401 A.2d at 100.
27. Some courts that have adopted Sponatski have applied only the irresistible impulse
segment of the test and have ignored the knowledge of consequences segment. See, e.g., An-
derson v. Armour & Co., 257 Minn. 281, 101 N.W.2d 435 (1960); Mercer v. Department of
Labor & Indus., 74 Wash. 2d 96, 442 P.2d 1000 (1968).
28. Many jurisdictions still follow the Sponatski rule. See, e.g., Schofield v. White, 250
Iowa 571, 95 N.W.2d 40 (1959); Anderson v. Armour & Co., 257 Minn. 281, 101 N.W.2d 435
(1960); Konazewska v. Erie R.R., 132 N.J.L. 424, 41 A.2d 130 (N.J. Super. Ct. 1945), aft'd, 133
N.J.L. 557, 45 A.2d 315 (N.J. 1946); Workmen's Compensation Bd. v. Sullivan, 22 Pa.
Commw. Ct. 386, 348 A.2d 925 (1975).
29. 43 So. 2d 464 (Fla. 1949).
workmen's compensation statute.3 ° Some variation exists between
the tests enunciated by jurisdictions adopting the chain of causation
approach. For example, New York courts have formulated a unique
"causation plus" test, found in Delinousha v. National Biscuit,3 ' that
requires the employee to suffer a deranged mental state beyond dis-
couragement, melancholy, or other "sane" conditions 32 to qualify for
death benefits.
The Delaware Superior Court used a two-pronged test similar
to the test found in Whitehead33 Initially, the court considered the
causal connection between the industrial injury and the suicide.34
This portion of the test is satisfied if "but for" the injury the suicide
would not have occurred. 35 Next, the court examined the decedent's
mental state at the time of the suicide to determine whether the dece-
dent's act was wilful for the purposes of the Delaware Workmen's
Compensation Act, which prohibits recovery for "wilful," self-in-
flicted injury.3 6 To meet the burden of proof on this issue, the claim-
ant must prove that the decedent's normal thought processes were
impaired by pain and depression arising out of an industrial acci-
dent.3 7 Unlike other jurisdictions applying the chain of causation
test, the Fox court did not require the existence of a mental distur-
bance, but merely evidence of pain and depression sufficient to im-
pair normal thought processes.38 If the claimant can show that "but
for"3 9 the injury no suicide would have occurred and that the dece-
30. Id at 465.
31. 248 N.Y. 93, 161 N.E. 431, - N.Y.S. - (1928).
32. Id. at 94, 161 N.E. at 432, - N.Y.S. at _. See also Richards v. Lavine, 48 App. Div.
2d 204, 369 N.Y.S.2d 31 (1975); Franzoni v. Loew's Theatre & Realty Corp., 22 App. Div. 2d
741, 253 N.Y.S.2d 505 (1964), appealdenied, 17 N.Y.2d 666, 216 N.E.2d 605, 269 N.Y.S.2d 444
(1966). But see Reinstein v. Merdola, 39 App. Div. 2d 369, 334 N.Y.S.2d 488 (1972), afl'd, 33
N.Y.2d 589, 301 N.E.2d 438, 347 N.Y.S.2d 455 (1973). Other jurisdictions have adopted stan-
dards that resemble the chain of causation test. See Wilder v. Russell Liab. Co., 107 Conn. 56,
139 A. 644 (1927) (insanity traceable to the employment); In re Fitzgibbons, - Mass. _, 373
N.E.2d 1174 (1978) (such unsoundness of mind that the employee is irresponsible for his sui-
cidal act); Industrial Comm'n v. Brubaker, 129 Ohio 617, 196 N.E. 409 (1935) (mental der-
angement to the extent that the employee cannot entertain a fixed purpose to take his life).
33. See note 30 and accompanying text supra.
34. Courts applying the chain of causation test have given various descriptions of the
causal relationship necessary for the award of compensation. See, e.g., Whitehead v. Keene
Roofing Co., 43 So. 2d 464 (Fla. 1949) (death directly attributable to); Rose v. Industrial
Comm'n, 8 Ariz. App. 182, 444 P.2d 739 (1968) (recognizable causal connection between in-
jury and death).
35. Accord, Burnight v. Industrial Accident Comm'n, 181 Cal. App. 2d 816, 5 Cal. Rptr.
786 (1960).
36. Unlike Fox, most jurisdictions that apply the chain of causation test require that the
employee suffer a disturbance of the mind arising out of an industrial injury that causes the
decedent to become devoid of normal judgment. See, e.g., Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. v. Indus-
trial Comm'n, 97 Ariz. 256, 399 P.2d 664 (1965); Jones v. Leon County Health Dep't, 335 So.
2d 269 (Fla. 1976); McDonald v. Atlantic Steel Co., 133 Ga. App. 157, 210 S.E.2d 344 (1974).
37. See note 36 supra.
38. 401 A.2d at 100.
39. The application of a pure "but for" test is extremely rare.
The minority rule is generally referred to, rather loosely, as a "chain of causation"
test. The terminology is somewhat misleading, since a liberal causation test, based
dent's normal thought processes were impaired by the pain and de-
pression arising out of the industrial injury, the employee's suicide
would not be wilful within the meaning of the forfeiture provision of
the Delaware Workmen's Compensation Act.4°
The court in Fox held that the causation element of the chain of
causation test was satisfied since "but for' '4 his injury Fox would not
have committed suicide. Upon examination of the record, the court
was persuaded by the evidence that prior to the accident Fox had not
exhibited suicidal tendencies. 42 The court also noted that before the
accident the decedent was able to cope with the death of his mother
and the birth of a daughter with a severe genetic defect without at-
tempting to take his life.43
In reaching its conclusion that the mental element of the chain
of causation test was satisfied, the court relied exclusively on the tes-
timony of Dr. Weintraub that the decedent's pain and suffering, aris-
ing out of the compensible injury, impaired the decedent's ability to
think clearly." Appellant's argument, based on Dr. Weintraub's tes-
timony, that Fox had the capacity to "wilfully and knowingly com-
mit suicide" was dismissed.45  The court felt that this testimony
contradicted Dr. Weintraub's earlier testimony that pain and depres-
sion produced by the injury had impaired Fox's ability to "think
clearly."' 46 The scope of review exercised by the Fox court was lim-
ited because prior Delaware decisions indicate that the findings of
the Industrial Accident Board will not be disturbed unless they are
purely on antecedent causation, would virtually result in absolute liability for em-
ployee suicides. Almost any suicide claim could produce enough evidence of work-
connected nervous strain and mental imbalance to meet a test based on "butfar"
causation.
8 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 673, 676 (1961). See Redmond v. Workmen's Compensation Appeals Bd.,
36 Cal. App. 3d 302, 111 Cal. Rptr. 530 (1973).
40. See note 4 supra. A premise upon which the Fox court based its decision, that Fox's
suicide was not willful, was that if the employee experiences pain and depression of such a
degree "as to override normal and rational judgment," the employee does not possess the
capacity to form a willful intention to commit suicide. 401 A.2d at 100. This concept is dis-
cussed at length in Burnight v. Industrial Accident Comm'n, 181 Cal. App. 2d 816, 5 Cal. Rptr.
786 (1960). After considering the California Penal Code requirement of a "sound mind and
discretion of the accused" for the foundation of criminal intent, CAL. PENAL CODE § 21 (West
1970), the Burnight court ruled that if due to a compensible injury the employee was unable to
exercise sound discretion, the suicide would not be "intentional" for the purposes of the Cali-
fornia workmen's compensation statute. This standard applies even if the employee had the
capacity to entertain a conscious volition to take his own life. 181 Cal. App. 2d at 824, 5 Cal.
Rptr. at 793. The Burnight court also stated that the decedent's knowledge of the consequences
of his suicidal act did not constitute intentional self-inflicted injury if the employee was com-
pelled to take his life as the result of a mental disturbance. Id at 820, 5 Cal. Rptr. at 790. The
Burnight opinion also incorporates the concept of irresistible impulse into the chain of causa-
tion test. See also Saunders v. Texas Employers Ass'n, 516 S.W.2d 242 (Tex. Civ. App. 1974).
41. 401 A.2d at 100. See note 39 supra.
42. Id See note 47 infra.
43. Id
44. Id See note II supra.
45. 401 A.2d at 100.
46. Id See note 47 and accompanying text infra.
not based on substantial evidence.47 The superior court concluded
that Dr. Weintraub's testimony, when viewed in its entirety, supplied
substantial competent evidence to support the Board's finding that
Fox's suicide was a result of the industrial accident he suffered in
1973.48
The chain of causation test applied by the Fox court49 is consis-
tent with the humanitarian purposes of the Delaware Workmen's
Compensation Act5" and properly places the costs of employment-
related suicides upon the industry rather than upon the innocent de-
pendents of the deceased employee or upon society." The Fox test
recognizes modem research in the field of psychiatry that indicates
that pain and despair can impair the employee's rational thought
processes. 52  In addition, the Fox court properly conditions the
award of benefits on a finding of a causal connection between the
initial injury, the employee's mental state, and the subsequent sui-
cide. Thus, the chain of causation test avoids the harsh effect of the
Sponatski rule, which denies the award of benefits when the evi-
dence shows that the decedent was aware of the consequences of his
suicidal act, 3 regardless of whether the suicide was the result of a
deranged mental state or unbearable pain.5 4 Finally, the test applied
in Fox avoids the burdensome requirement of Sponatski that the
claimant prove that the employee's suicide was the result of an un-
controllable impulse and that the decedent was unaware of the con-
sequences of his suicidal act.5
47. The Delaware Workmen's Compensation Act establishes the Industrial Accident
Board as the initial factfinder. Fiorucci v. C.F. Braun & Co., 173 A.2d 635 (Del. Super. Ct.
1961).
"The scope of judicial review of factual findings of the Industrial Accident Board, both in
the Superior Court and in this court is limited to a determination of whether or not there was
substantial evidence sufficient to support those findings." Avon Prods. v. Lamparski, 293 A.2d
559, 560 (Del. 1972). Accord, Lester C. Newton Truck Co. v. Neal, 58 Del. 55, 204 A.2d 393
(1964); General Motors Corp. v. Freeman, 53 Del. 74, 164 A.2d 686 (1960). But see Reynolds
v. Continental Can Co., 240 A.2d 135 (Del. 1968).
48. 401 A.2d at 101.
49. See note 56 and accompanying text infra.
50. One of the primary purposes of the Delaware Workmen's Compensation Act is to
assure the worker a prompt and certain means of receiving compensation and medical care
regardless of fault. Hill v. Moskin Stores, Inc., 53 Del. 117, 165 A.2d 447 (1960). In addition,
by allocating the costs of the industrial accident to the industry employing the injured worker,
the industry can pass on the costs to those who enjoy the benefits procured by that industry.
lanire v. University of Del., 255 A.2d 687 (Del. Super. Ct. 1969). Liberal interpretation of the
Act furthers the achievement of its broad humanitarian purposes. Children's Bureau of Del. v.
Nissen, 29 A.2d 603 (Del. Super. Ct. 1942).
5 1. See note 50 supra. See also Burnight v. Industrial Accident Comm'n, 181 Cal. App.
2d 816, 5 Cal. Rptr. 786 (1960); Whitehead v. Keene Roofing Co., 43 So. 2d 464 (Fla. 1949);
Petty v. Associated Transp., Inc., 276 N.C. 417, 173 S.E.2d 321 (1970); Brenne v. Department
of Labor & Human Relations, 38 Wis. 2d 84, 156 N.W.2d 497 (1968).
52. See generally Patel, Pathology of Suicide, 13 MED. Sci. & L. 103 (1973).
53. See Larson, supra note 14, at 47.
54. See note 22 and accompanying text supra
55. One court has held that the determination of the decedent's mental state at time of
death was beyond the expertise of lay witnesses and, therefore, expert witness testimony is
The impact of the Fox test on the private employer is unclear at
this time and will be determined by future application of the rule by
the Delaware courts. Essentially, the test enunciated in Fox is satis-
fied upon proof of two factors: first, that "but for"56 the injury the
death would not have occurred; and second, that pain and depres-
sion caused by an industrial accident impaired the employee's nor-
mal thought process. The first element of the test does not present a
difficult obstacle for the claimant to overcome. Under the "but for"
element of the Fox test, it is unnecessary for the claimant to prove
that the pain and depression caused by the industrial injury was the
sole or even major cause of the suicide.57 Dr. Weintraub's testimony
indicated that Fox's industrial injury was merely a cause of his
death.58 Furthermore, the findings of the Industrial Accident Board,
which were affirmed by the court, established that the injury was a
precipitating factor that triggered Fox's death.59
The Fox court failed to discuss the extent of pain necessary to
satisfy the devoid of normal judgment requirement.6° The court re-
lied exclusively on the testimony of Dr. Weintraub that decedent's
pain and depression had precluded his ability to "think clearly.'
The court's discussion of the facts was limited, however, by the scope
of judicial review, which was restricted to the determination of
whether the findings of the Industrial Accident Board were sup-
ported by substantial evidence.62 Undoubtedly, a certain level of
pain and depression are normally associated with a serious industrial
injury. The injured employee is often concerned about his inability
to return to work, possibly for an indefinite period of time, and he is
faced with the prospect of supporting his family and meeting
financial obligations on a fraction of his former income.63  If this
necessary before the Industrial Accident Board can grant compensation. Reynolds Metal Co.
v. Industrial Comm'n of Ariz., 119 Ariz. App. 560, 582 P.2d 656 (1978).
56. 400 A.2d at 100. "The trend in jurisdictions having statutes precluding recovery if an
injury or death is wilfully self-inflicted is to apply a chain of causation test; that is, 'but for' the
injury the suicide would not have occurred . . . .The chain of causation test is the more
reasonable rule and should be adopted in Delaware." Id
57. A preceding physical injury or the existence of pain is not always necessary for the
award of workmen's compensation benefits. See Burnight v. Industrial Accident Comm'n, 181
Cal. App. 2d 816, 5 Cal. Rptr. 786 (1960) (nervous breakdown); Wilder v. Russell Liab. Co.,
107 Conn. 56, 139 A. 644 (1927) (physical and nervous breakdown); Jones v. Leon County
Health Dep't, 335 So. 2d 269 (Fla. 1976) (employee contracted tuberculosis at work); In re
Fitzgibbons, - Mass. -, 373 N.E.2d 1174 (1978) (traumatic death of corrections officer caused
supervisor's mental breakdown); Anderson v. Armour & Co., 257 Minn. 281, 101 N.W.2d 435
(1960) (decedent truck driver sustained psychological shock after striking a pedestrian with his
truck).
58. 401 A.2d at 99.
59. See note 11 supra.
60. The court also failed to discuss any objective manifestations of Fox's impaired
mental state other than his suicide.
61. 401 A.2d at 100.
62. See note 47 supra.
63. Under the Delaware Workmen's Compensation Act, the employee, if totally dis-
abled, is entitled to 662h% of his wages, but benefits are not to exceed 66% of the average
natural level of pain and frustration is sufficient, under the Fox test,
to impair the employee's normal thought processes to a degree suffi-
cient to preclude the formulation of a wilful intent to commit sui-
cide, virtually all employee suicides following a serious industrial
injury would be compensible under the Delaware Workmen's Com-
pensation Act.64 Such a result nulifies the provision of the Act
prohibiting the award of compensation arising out of the employee's
wilful intention to cause self-inflicted, bodily injury or death.6" This
would, in effect, change the Act into an industry-supported charity
or mandatory life insurance program.66
A thorough survey of the cases that have adopted the devoid of
normal judgment requirement fails to disclose any cases that have
denied benefits on the basis of an insufficient degree of pain and
depression to impair normal thought processes. 67 Although a denial
of benefits under the chain of causation test is rare, courts that have
denied benefits have relied on the basis of the claimant's failure to
prove the necessary causal relationship between the injury and the
subsequent suicide.68
The Fox court has interpreted the "wilful" provision of the Del-
aware Workmen's Compensation Act to require a showing that the
employee's normal thought processes were unimpaired at the time of
weekly wage announced by the Secretary of the United States Department of Labor for the
preceding calendar year. 19 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 19, § 2324 (Supp. 1978). Death benefits
under the Act are substantial. The decedent's spouse is entitled to 66;6% to 80% of the em-
ployee's salary but not more than 80% of the average weekly wage as announced by the Secre-
tary of Labor for the preceding calendar year. These compensation benefits continue for 400
weeks. Id § 2330.
64. "Despite its overwhelming simplicity as a legal doctrine, application of a pure chain-
of-causation theory is oncomnon, partly because of statutes that exclude compensation for
voluntary suicides." 54 TEX. L. REV. 782, 783 (1975). See also note 39 supra.
65. See note 4 supra. See also Jones v. Cascade Wood Prod., Inc., 21 Or. App. 86, 533
P.2d 1399 (1975).
66. The act is not, however, based on eleemosynary principles, but upon the funda-
mentals of injury or death arising out of and in the course of employment, and reli-
ance upon the employee's earnings for support. Indiscriminate awards of
compensation, based on uncertain evidence, or on sympathy, are not in the public
interest.
Children's Bureau of Del. v. Nissen, 29 A.2d 603, 609 (Del. Super. Ct. 1942). See generally Air
Mod. Corp. v. Newton, 59 Del 48, 215 A.2d 434 (1965) (workmen's compensation statute not
intended to be a health insurance statute); General Motors Corp. v. Socorso, 105 A.2d 641
(Del. Super. Ct. 1954) (statute written for benefit of both worker and employer and to protect
employer against unreasonable charges and fraudulent claims).
67. One explanation for this conclusion may be that one who commits suicide commits
an irrational act and is implicitly devoid of normal judgment. "[Dr. Walter A. Abboti testified
it was his opinion that at the time a person actually commit a suicidal act he is of unsound
mind and that all suicides are committed by people who are momentarily insane at the time
they perform the deed." Schoenfield v. White, 250 Iowa 511, 95 N.W.2d 40 (1959).
68. See Reynolds Metal Co. v. Industrial Comm'n of Ariz., 119 Ariz. App. 566, 582 P.2d
656 (1978); Rose v. Industrial Comm'n of Ariz., 8 Ariz. App. 182, 444 P.2d 739 (1968); In re
Oberlander, 348 Mass. 1, 200 N.E.2d 268 (1964). But cf. McDonald v. Atlantic Steel, 133 Ga.
App. 157, 210 S.E.2d 344 (1974) (compensation denied on claimant's failure to prove causa-
tion, but also stated that the showing of pain and depression did not demand a finding of
mental disorder sufficient to impair normal judgment).
his suicide. In drafting this provision, it is unlikely that the Dela-
ware Legislature intended to require a subjective mental state similar
to that required for the formation of criminal intent.69 Instead, the
legislature probably intended to deny compensation if the em-
ployee's suicidal act was voluntary, knowing, and purposeful, as op-
posed to accidental.7" Thus, the devoid of normal judgment
requirement is not a valid test to determine whether an employee's
suicide is "wilful"'" within the meaning of the Delaware Workmen's
Compensation Act.
The Delaware Supreme Court, in a brief opinion affirming the
decision of the lower court,72 explained and clarified the test set forth
by Judge Bifferato in Fox. The supreme court stressed the statutory
language of the Delaware Workmen's Compensation Act, which
provides that a suicide is compensible only if the employee was inca-
pable of forming a "wilful intention" to take his own life. 73 Accord-
ing to the court, in order to satisfy this provision of the statute, the
employee must have been capable of exercisingfree will in reaching
the decision to take his own life.74 Thus, even if the employee was
aware of the nature and consequences of his acts and took his life
voluntarily, his act was not "wilful" if it was the direct result of a
compensible accident and the related pain and dispair was sufficient
to override the decedent'sfree will 75 Despite this clarification of the
69. See generally DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 1, § 407 (1974) (lack of intention or knowledge
due to mental disability as affirmative defense).
70. See note 39 supra. In 1917 the Delaware Legislature enacted the Delaware Work-
men's Compensation Law of 1917, 29 Del. Laws 233, which contained the statutory bar to
recovery of benefits arising out of a wilful or intentional suicide. The only judicial decision
then existing pertaining to the award of benefits for a work related suicide was In re Sponatsk
The Sponaski test prohibited the award of benefits if the decedent knew or was aware of the
consequences of his act. This would support earlier Delaware cases that defined "wilful" as
meaning knowing, purposeful, and voluntary, as opposed to accidental. See Carey v. Gryan &
Rollins, 117 A.2d 240 (Del. Super. Ct. 1955); Lobdell Car Wheel Co. v. Subielski, 125 A. 462
(Del. Super. Ct. 1924).
71. See note4 supra.
72. Delaware Tire Center v. Fox, 411 A.2d 606 (Del. 1980). The Delaware Supreme
Court quoted the following language from the lower court opinion with approval:
[D]eath by suicide would be compensable if it is caused by severe pain and despair
which proximately results from a compensable accident, and is of such a degree so as
to override normal and rational judgment. A suicide committed under such circum-
stances cannot be said to be [a death of wilful intention] even though the act itself
may be volitional.
Id at 667. The supreme court's only modification of the test set forth in the lower court
opinion was the substitution of the phrase, "a death of wilful intention" for the word "inten-
tional."
73. See note 4 supra.
74. Delaware Tire Center v. Fox, 411 A.2d 606, 667 (Del. 1980).
75. Both the supreme court and the superior court have created a new test for determin-
ing whether an act is "wilful" for the purposes of the Act. To support its decision, the superior
court quoted language from two prior Delaware cases defining the "wilful intention" provision
of the Delaware Workmen's Compensation Act, Carey v. Bryan & Rollins, 49 Del. 387, 117
A.2d 240 (1955), and Lobdell v. Subielski, 32 Del. 462, 125 A. 462 (1924). In Lobdell, the court
stated, "In the present statute we believe wilful was used to define an act done intentionally,
knowingly and purposefully, without justifyable excuse, as opposed to an act done carelessly,
Fox test by the supreme court, the court failed to provide a set of
objective guidelines to assist the Industrial Accident Board and the
courts in making the difficult case-by-case determination of the de-
gree of pain, suffering, and despair necessary to override the em-
ployee's free will Consequently, the decision of the supreme court
fails to answer the question of whether mere proof of a suicide fol-
lowing a serious, employment-related injury will support the infer-
ence that the employee was incapable of forming a "wilful intention"
to commit suicide for the purposes of the Act.
The Fox decision places Delaware in the mainstream of juris-
dictions rejecting the strict Sponatski test and awarding death bene-
fits to the dependents of the deceased employee upon a showing that
an industrial injury resulted in the employee becoming devoid of
normal judgment. Although the Fox decision furthers the general
purposes of the Workmen's Compensation Act, all suicides following
serious industrial accidents may provide sufficient evidence of pain
and depression to satisfy the vague devoid of normal judgment ele-
ment of the Fox test. Thus, death benefits would be awarded on the
mere showing that "but for" the industrial injury the suicide would
not have occurred. This result would negate the express provision of
the Delaware Workmen's Compensation Act denying compensation
for an employee's wilful intention to commit suicide. If the legisla-
ture determines that the test announced in Fox places too great a
burden on the employer, it can avoid this result by amending the
Act.
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thoughtlessly, headessly or inadvertantly. " Id at 463. In quoting the above language, the supe-
rior court deleted the portion of the test in italics. This truncation of the existing Delaware
rule makes the result reached in Fox possible. Under the prior test if the employee's act of
suicide was voluntary or intentional, it would qualify as a "wilful" act and recovery would be
barred by the workmen's compensation act.
76. In 1966, the Minnesota Workmen's Compensation Act contained a provision that
barred recovery of workmen's compensation benefits if the employment related "injury or
death was intentionally self-inflicted." MINN. STAT. ANN. § 176.021 (West 1966) (amended
1973). The Minnesota Legislature amended the Act in 1967 by inserting the phrase, "suicide is
not compensible." 1967 Minn. Laws. ch. 701 § 2. In Schwartz v. Talmo, - Minn. -, 205
N.w.2d 318 (1973), a four to three decision, the Minnesota Supreme Court held that the
amendment was constitutional and effectively barred the plaintiff's claim for death benefits
arising out of her husband's suicide. In its decision, the court suggested that the amendment
was harsh and regressive and pointed out that Minnesota was the only state with such legisla--
tion. Shortly after the opinion was issued, the statute was amended by deleting the criticized
phrase. 1973 Minn. Laws ch. 623. [Casenote by James B. Ropp]

